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PAPERS / Papers
Includes copies of 5 Chinese papers from yutengfei.com, demonstrating arguments around fairness, contribution, distribution, strategy and long-term cooperation. The complete text, PDF and Chinese original manuscript can be read on this website, and the author, source and version are retained with the text.
Public reading does not mean formal publication. Working papers and hypotheses to be tested remain in their original state; unimplemented experiments are not considered verified conclusions.
5 papers · Original Chinese text
The shareholder supremacy theory understands the company as a connection of private contracts and advocates maximizing shareholder wealth as the core goal; this article proposes a stakeholder corporate governance framework that adapts to the contemporary economy in the context of intelligent, financial and global restructuring.
Joint improvement often requires suppliers to advance tooling, testing and on-site costs before sharing cost reductions or order benefits in the future. Delayed returns increase waiting and exposure, which may weaken the willingness to continue cooperation; therefore, purchasers tend to exchange compensation promises for current investments. Williamson has long pointed out that specialized investments require credible commitments to support transactions;[1] research on reciprocity and relationship networks shows that long-term cooperation can organize knowledge sharing. [2][3] The gap is whether the degree to which the promise is verifiable and enforceable can mitigate the negative effects of delay when the return amount is comparable to the risk profile, and whether the supplier's liquidity constraints can override this mitigation.
The continued growth of an enterprise relies on employees and teams to continue to invest in knowledge, collaboration, innovation and relationship maintenance beyond their responsibilities. Existing research on organizational justice has shown that a sense of fairness can promote organizational citizenship behavior, but most studies still understand employees as being managed within the organization, and less often explain from the perspective of participants in cooperation programs why people are still willing to continue to make voluntary contributions that are difficult to measure immediately after they have received current rewards. This article connects Phillips' stakeholder fairness principle with the literature on organizational justice, social exchange and organizational trust, and proposes the influencing mechanism of "stakeholder fairness perception-trust-voluntary contribution behavior".
Growing manufacturing companies often do not lack feedback channels. Employees can report the same product quality defects through team, quality inspection and internal systems, and customers can report the same defects through complaints, returns, reviews and after-sales records. As a result, companies accumulate a wealth of opinions, but often cannot identify which one changed standards, budgets, or interdepartmental processes. The voice and issue selling literature has explained why people speak up and how middle managers put issues on the agenda;[1][2] the quality management literature describes how complaints are classified and handled. The gap lies in: how the status of evidence, organizational translation, agenda authority and resource commitment are connected or broken when the same quality issue comes from internal and external sources, and why the number of channels cannot guarantee transformation.
Joint improvement projects often produce two types of facts at the same time: one party has stronger bargaining power, exit threat or rule veto ability; the other party actually completes a larger part of the technology, cost reduction or collaborative contribution. When the ranking of power is inconsistent with the ranking of realized strategic contributions, incremental benefits tend to be distributed by power rather than by contribution. Existing stakeholder research has compared the effects of power and strategic importance on value distribution and found that strategic importance is sometimes a better predictor of distribution than power. [1] Supply chain experiments show that fairness concerns prevent the extraction of surplus exclusively by power. [2] These findings are important but do not yet address whether verifiable contribution records and independent review procedures can change allocation choices when a mismatch has occurred.
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